Journal of Digital Forensics,
Security and Law
Volume 11

Number 2

Article 1

2016

Exploring Deviant Hacker Networks (DHM) on Social Media
Platforms
Samer Al-khateeb
University of Arkansas, Little Rock

Kevin J. Conlan
University of New Haven

Nitin Agarwal
University of Arkansas, Little Rock

Ibrahim Baggili
University of New Haven
Follow
this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl
Frank Breitinger
University of New Haven
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security
Commons

Recommended Citation
Al-khateeb, Samer; Conlan, Kevin J.; Agarwal, Nitin; Baggili, Ibrahim; and Breitinger, Frank (2016)
"Exploring Deviant Hacker Networks (DHM) on Social Media Platforms," Journal of Digital Forensics,
Security and Law: Vol. 11 : No. 2 , Article 1.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2016.1375
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol11/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics,
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact commons@erau.edu.

(c)ADFSL

Exploring Deviant Hacker Networks ...

JDFSL V11N2

EXPLORING DEVIANT HACKER
NETWORKS (DHN) ON SOCIAL MEDIA
PLATFORMS
1

2

1

2

Samer Al-khateeb , Kevin J Conlan , Nitin Agarwal , Ibrahim Baggili , and

2

Frank Breitinger

1

Department of Information Science

Center of Social Media and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS)
University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 2801 S University Ave, Little Rock, AR 72204
{sxalkhateeb,nxagarwal}@ualr.edu

2

Cyber Forensics Research & Education Group (UNHcFREG)
Tagliatela College of Engineering, ECECS

University of New Haven, 300 Boston Post Rd, West Haven, CT 06516
{kconl1, ibaggili, fbreitinger}@newhaven.edu

ABSTRACT
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have grown exponentially over the past decade.
tial use of social media for

benign

The ini-

purposes (e.g., to socialize with friends, browse pictures

and photographs, and communicate with family members overseas) has now transitioned
to include

malicious

activities (e.g., cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare). These

nefarious uses of OSNs poses a signicant threat to society, and thus requires research attention. In this exploratory work, we study activities of one deviant groups: hacker groups
on social media, which we term

Deviant Hacker Networks

(DHN). We investigated the con-

nection between dierent DHNs on Twitter: how they are connected, identied the powerful
nodes, which nodes sourced information, and which nodes act as bridges between dierent
network components. From this, we were able to identify and articulate specic examples
of DHNs communicating with each other, with the goal of committing some form of deviant
act online. In our work, we also attempted to bridge the gap between the empirical study
of OSNs and cyber forensics, as the growth of OSNs is now bringing these two domains
together, due to OSNs continuously generating vast amounts of evidentiary data.

Keywords: deviant hacking groups, focal structure analysis, FSA, groups coordination,
collective action, deviant groups.

1. INTRODUCTION
In a relatively short period of time, On-

tionized how societies interact with the Internet, especially with regards to communication.

While this new phenomenon in

line Social Networks (OSNs) have revoluc 2016 ADFSL

Page 7

JDFSL V11N2

Exploring Deviant Hacker Networks ...

online socialization has brought the world

and monitored?; 3) Can their coordination

closer together, OSNs have also led to new

strategies and communication networks be

vectors to facilitate cybercrime, cyberterror-

inferred from empirical observation, data set

ism, and other deviant behaviors.

collection, and analysis?

Online

deviant

groups have grown in par-

and; 4) Can the

most inuential set of nodes be identied?

Groups with malicious

It is apparent that these questions require

actors, such as Islamic State of Iraq and

inquiry since at the time of writing this pa-

the Levant (ISIL) typically disseminate their

per, research on this topic was sparse. Our

message of terror and recruit people using

work resulted in the following contributions:

allel with OSNs.

OSNs.

Black hat hackers with the intent

of coordinating cyber attacks may also be

•

vide insights about DHNs from OSNs

considered another group with malicious in-

(e.g., the communications of nodes be-

tent. The threat these deviant groups pose

tween and within their respective focal

is real and can manifest in several forms

structures.

of deviance, such as the disabling of critical infrastructure (e.g., the Ukraine power
outage caused by Russian-sponsored hack-

•

1

cial media as a means to communicate

, and ISIL recruiters who in-

and coordinate their attacks.

uence impressionable youth on Internet forums and social media outlets to join extrem-

We observed and analyzed the communication network of DHNs that use so-

ers that coordinated a cyber attack in December 2015

We proposed a framework that can pro-

•

We were able to identify key accounts

ist groups and participate in heinous acts of

(e.g., powerful sources of information

terror (Al-khateeb & Agarwal, 2015a). Ob-

through the measure of their out-degree

servable malicious behaviors in OSNs, simi-

centrality) and powerful coordinating

lar to the aforementioned ones, continue to

DHNs using the Focal Structure Analy-

negatively impact society. This necessitates

sis (FSA) algorithm.

their scientic inquiry.
It would be of benet to the Informa-

The rest of the article is organized as fol-

and its re-

lows. Theoretical background of the research

spective sub-domains, to conduct novel re-

is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents

search on the phenomenon of deviant be-

the research methodology, including a de-

havior in OSNs.

One evident form of de-

scription of the data set and software used

viant behavior comes in the form of commu-

to collect the data, then results and analysis,

nications between black hat hacking groups

and nally our proposed framework. Section

on OSNs, which we term

4 concludes the study with possible future

tion Assurance (IA) domain,

Networks

Deviant Hacker

(DHN). In this preliminary work

we attempted to answer the following research questions:

1) Do DHNs employ so-

cial media platforms to coordinate attacks?
If so, what are their levels of sophistication?; 2) Can their aliations be tracked

1 U.S.

helping Ukraine investigate power grid
hack. Reuters. Jan. 12 2016. Available at:
http://reut.rs/1PqNAYG.
Page 8

research directions.

2. RELATED WORK

2.1 Forensic Analysis of Social
Applications
Most scientic work to date has focused on
the acquisition of social data from digital
devices as well as applications installed on
c 2016 ADFSL
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them.

Over time, OSNs have become the

largest and fastest growing entities on the
Internet, containing hundreds of millions of
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from the very OSNs that result from the use
of these applications.
These

examples

of

traditional

digital

people, and now bots. OSNs, hosted on plat-

forensic research initiatives are of relevance

forms like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter,

to our work, as evidence to the activities,

contain a plethora of data about its mem-

communications, and motives of DHNs may

bers, which is of interest to both digital

be recovered from artifacts left behind by

forensic scientists and practitioners Huber et

users of social networking applications - ei-

al. (2011).

ther from the device, or from the network

The forensic potential of these

OSNs has been acknowledged by research,

trac generated by the applications.

and there have been a number of studies

Nonetheless, this data would be based on

on extracting this forensically relevant data

the analysis of the more traditional sources

from them.

of evidence found on systems and devices,

In the seminal work by Al Mutawa, Bag-

such as le systems and captured network

gili, and Marrington (2012), researchers con-

trac. OSNs are continuously creating and

ducted the primary forensic analysis of three

storing data on multiple servers across the

popular social networking smartphone appli-

Internet through their respective social net-

cations:

works.

Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace.

These newer forms of data, espe-

Their results indicated that while no traces

cially the communications of hacker groups

of forensically valuable artifacts were retriev-

on OSNs, would likely pertain to, for exam-

able from Blackberry devices, iPhones and

ple, coordination and planning. This would

Android phones stored a signicant amount

mean that traditional methods of forensic in-

of valuable data on user activities that may

vestigation would be insucient, as this data

be recovered by forensic investigators. This

would be real-time, constantly expanding,

data included usernames, passwords, chat

and simply not found in traditional sources

messages, posts, location data, and pictures,

of forensic evidence.

from the storage on these devices. Walnycky,

2.2 Forensic Retrieval of
OSN-generated
Evidentiary Data

Baggili, Marrington, Moore, and Breitinger

As discussed, a growing challenge for foren-

(2015) forensically acquired and analyzed lo-

sic investigations is the emergence of OSNs

cally stored data and network trac of 20

and their multitude of online communication

popular Android social-messaging applica-

vectors, producing data with heightened vol-

tions. They were able to reconstruct partial

ume, variety and velocity - big data at its

or entire message contents from 16 of the 20

essence. This data cannot be accessed using

applications in their study.

traditional digital forensic techniques related

just to name a few (Al Mutawa et al., 2012).
Other work also focused on the retrieval of
artifacts from the network captures of socialmessaging applications as opposed to data

While this re-

ected poorly on the security of the appli-

to storage and memory media analysis.

cations, it could be seen positively with re-

Baggili and Breitinger (2015) highlighted

gards to evidence collection from a forensics

that social media is growing as a data source

standpoint. Their reconstruction and inter-

for cyber forensics, providing new types of

ception of passwords, pictures, videos, audio,

artifacts that can be relevant to investiga-

and other forms of digital artifacts signies

tions. They identied key social media data

the great potential for extracting evidence

sources (e.g., text posts, friends/groups, im-

c 2016 ADFSL
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2.3 Intelligence-driven
Analyses of OSNs

ages, geolocation data, demographic information, videos, dates/times), as well as their
corresponding applications to cyber forensics
(author attribution, social network identi-

As OSNs continuously replace traditional

cation, facial/object recognition, personal-

means of digital storage, sharing, and com-

ity proling, location nding, cyber prol-

munication (Huber et al., 2011), collecting

ing, deception detection, event reconstruc-

this ever-growing volume of data is becoming

tion, etc.).

a challenge.

Baggili and Breitinger (2015) further emphasized that in the future, practitioners
should embrace the idea of using real-time
intelligence to assist in investigations, and
not just post-mortem data.

Within the past decade, data

collected from OSNs has already played a
major role as evidence in criminal cases, either as incriminating evidence or to conrm
alibis

2 3 4

Online

.
deviant

groups,

like

terrorist

groups, criminal organizations, and in our

Key work in this realm was executed by

specic research interest, DHNs, continue to

Mulazzani, Huber, and Weippl (2012), where

utilize OSNs to promote, enhance, and fa-

they addressed the challenge of traditional

cilitate their respective goals.

computer forensics in the growing number

more ecient to take an intelligence-driven

of cases that involve evidence being gener-

approach for identifying evidentiary trails.

ated through cloud services and their use of

Harvesting forensically relevant data directly

distributed data centers (Mulazzani et al.,

from targeted OSN user accounts, as we aim

2012).

In their work, they identied key

to do in our work, would be more ecient

data sources and analytical methods for au-

than traditional forensic techniques of ana-

tomated forensic analysis on social network

lyzing the hardware, network trac, le sys-

user data.

tems, and other traditional scenarios in dig-

This work is relevant to our re-

search, as the hundreds of millions of OSN
users online makes the forensic data extraction from them a requirement. Furthermore,
Mulazzani et al. (2012) were able to present
a method to evaluate these data sources in
an automated fashion and generate visual
graphs of interest. To note, their work was
conducted without the need to collaborate
with the social network operator (in their
case, Facebook).
Based on prior work in this domain, it

It might be

ital forensics.
Interestingly, despite the growing importance of data that can be extracted from
OSNs, there has been little academic research aimed at developing and enhancing
techniques to eectively collect and analyze this data Huber et al. (2011).

Our

work aims to take steps towards bridging the
gap between cyber forensics and social network analysis through a primary exploratory
study that focuses on DHNs.

Despite the

is clear that OSNs contain vast amounts

lack of research in this domain, there have

of important, and often publicly accessible

been seminal research eorts similar to our

data that can service cyber forensics and re-

proposed work.

lated disciplines. A progression must thus be
made towards developing and/or adopting
methodologies to eectively collect and analyze evidentiary data extracted from OSNs,
and leverage them in relevant domains outside of classical information sciences.

Page 10

status update provides alibi. CNN.
2009.
3 Criminal Found via Facebook. The New York
Criminal Law Blog. 2009.
4 Facebook: a place to meet, gossip, share photos
of stolen goods. The Washington Post. 2010.
2 Facebook

c 2016 ADFSL
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A similar research thrust was conducted
by Huber et al. (2011), where they utilized
an automated web browser combined with

JDFSL V11N2

dia blogs (Al-khateeb & Agarwal, Under review).
FSA has also been used in the case of

an OSN third party application (in this case,

Dragoon Ride Exercise

Facebook) to gather

social snapshots

the

to discover the most

of data

inuential set of botnets or the seeders of

sets of user data and relational information

information used to disseminate the propa-

of the targeted social network.

ganda (bots that by working together pro-

In our work, we used an algorithm developed by en, Wigand, Agarwal, Tokdemir,
and Kasprzyk (2016) to discover

sets of individuals

inuential

foundly impact propaganda dissemination)
(Al-khateeb & Agarwal, Under review).

3. EXPLORATORY
WORK

in online social networks

called Focal Structure Analysis (FSA) (en,
Wigand, Agarwal, Mete, & Kasprzyk, 2014).

3.1 Data Collection

This algorithm has been tested on many

the Saudi Arabian
women's Oct26Driving campaign on Twitter

A seed data set was created by manually

(Yuce, Agarwal, Wigand, Lim, & Robinson,

searching for hacker accounts on Twitter.

2014). Results showed that focal structures

The accounts chosen were selected based

are

on their self-identifying statuses as hackers

real world cases such as

more interactive than average individuals and more interactive than communities

with deviant and malicious intentions.

We

in the evolution of a mass protest, i.e., the

started with a list of 49 DHNs known for

interaction rate of focal structures are signif-

their promotion of deviant activities and per-

icantly higher than the average interaction

sonas.

rate of random sets of individuals, and the

that some self-proclaimed hacker accounts

number of retweets, mentions, and replies in-

on Twitter are actually benevolent in nature,

crease proportionally with respect to the fol-

i.e., white-hat hackers.

lowers of the individuals within communities

were avoided.

(en et al., 2016).

62 Twitter accounts for these DHNs (some

The 2014 Ukraine Crisis

To note, the researchers are aware

These accounts

We were able to identify

is another FSA

groups have more than one account, and

When a British jour-

some groups we could not nd their Twitter

nalist and a blogger known as Graham W.

handles). We crawled their Twitter network

Phillips covered the 2014 Ukraine crisis and

using NodeXl (Foundation, 2014) which uses

became a growing star on Kremlin-owned

the Twitter API to collect data for the period

media (Seddon, 2014; en et al., 2016), FSA

between 11/25/2008 7:03:30 PM UTC and

was applied on a blog-blog network and re-

11/28/2015 9:20:06 PM UTC. This resulted

sults illustrated that Graham Phillips was

in a directed graph that contained 58,120

involved in the only focal structure of the

unique

entire network along with ITAR-TASS (the

edges.

Russian News Agency) and Voice of Rus-

87,318). The edges were as follows:

application example.

twitter

nodes

and

76,964

unique

(Total edges with duplicates are

sia (the Russian government's international
radio broadcasting service).

Graham W.

•

We obtained 2,837 Tweet edges: these

Phillips was actively involved in the crisis as

are

a blogger, and maintained a single-authored

tweets something.

blog with signicant inuence when com-

sented self-loops (from the user tweeting

pared to some of the active mainstream me-

to him/herself ).

c 2016 ADFSL

the

edges

created

when

a

user

These are repre-

Page 11
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We obtained 6,148 Mentions

edges:

Table 1.

The number of nodes in each of

these are the edges created when a

the focal structures.

The focal structure

user mentions someone (i.e., include a

FSA_ID1 has the highest number of nodes.

preceeding `@' character with another

The FSA_ID is to distinguish the FSAs

Twitter handle) in the tweet or retweet

only.

of another user.

•

Focal structure

Number of nodes

ID

in the FSA

FSA_ID1

18

FSA_ID2

3

FSA_ID3

5

FSA_ID4

2

FSA_ID5

2

FSA_ID6

9

FSA_ID7

3

FSA_ID8

16

We obtained 1,405 Replies to edges:
these are a special form of the mention
edges that occur when the user's name
is at the very start of a tweet.

•

We obtained 76,928 Friends and Followers edges: these are the edges created when a user follows or followed by
other users.

The network also contained 6 isolates (one
node

alone

not

connected

to

any

other

nodes) and 1 big connected component (everyone is connected to some other nodes).
The big component had
and

87, 318

edges.

58, 114 unique nodes

The network we col-

lected also had a maximum geodesic distance

(Diameter) = 9 which meant the network is
quite large (it takes a maximum of 9 steps
to get from one side of the network to the
other) but also the network has an average
geodesic distance = 3.8 which portrays that
information is likely to reach all the nodes
in the network quite quickly (Hanneman &
Riddle, 2005).

3.2 Results & Discussion

In this section, we discuss the results we obtained from applying social network analysis
on the collected data, then discuss the results we obtained form applying FSA (en
et al., 2016).

3.2.1

are appropriate for discerning if a counter
message were to be pushed to the same audience who follow these specic hashtags),
or keywords/ bigrams (See Table 3 Appendix A) (which are useful for exploring
what these groups are mainly talking about
without having to read entire tweets), the
most used URLs (to explore what messages
these groups are trying to deliver e.g., is it
a YouTube video?

Social Network Analysis of the

As mentioned earlier, we collected the Twitter network of the identied DHN accounts.
By examining their overall network we were
able to identify the most used hashtags (See

or a blog entry?, etc.),

and the domains they used frequently (can
be used as seed knowledge to be fed into
forensic investigations to discover other related websites e.g., websites managed by the
same Unique Identier can be retrieved using digital forensic techniques, nding geolocations, IP Addresses, owner details, etc.).
From

the

primary

analysis,

ed three key ndings:
to the

Data

Page 12

Table 2 Appendix A) in the network (these

bigram

we

identi-

1) with regards

tango,down, which has the

largest entire graph count (173). The hacker
group, Anonymous, often included the

tag

hash-

Tango Down to signify a successful

5

DDoS attack ; 2) the

5 Anonymous:

down'.

hashtag

#OpNimr",

CIA, Interpol websites 'tango

Reuters. 2012.

c 2016 ADFSL
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Figure 1.

The Communication Network of the DHNs.

JDFSL V11N2

Green Edges represent "Replies

to" relation between the accounts. Black Edges represent "Mentions" relation between the
accounts

c 2016 ADFSL
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Figure 2. The communication network of the DHNs with the identied FSAs (displayed on
the right). On the left side we zoom-in on the FSAs which are distinguished by dierent
colors)

Figure 3. The Focal Structures obtained form the Social Network of the DHNs

Page 14
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Figure 4. The Proposed Framework to Study Online Deviant Group Networks

which had the second largest entire graph

replies ) (See Figure

count (379) referred to the threat of the

network shown in Figure 1 contains 2,740

hacktivist group, Anonymous, to attack the

nodes and 3,445 edges. On the other hand,

Saudi Government websites

as an expres-

the social network contains 56,964 Nodes

sion of their support for a Saudi youth who

and 76,766 edges (not shown here due to its

was captured at the age of 17 participat-

massive size).

6

1 ). The communication

ing in protest against the Saudi govern-

By examining their communication net-

ment and sentenced to death, and; 3) the

work (Agent X Agent Network of users with

hashtag #OpBeast

, which had the third

mentions, replies, and tweets), we were able

largest entire graph count (213) referring

to identify the accounts they interacted with

to the attack that was planned by Anony-

the most,

mous, against animal cruelty and deprav-

most, and the accounts that helped spread

ity websites.

their messages by retweeting it.

7

Anonymous were encourag-

the accounts that tweeted the
Observing

ing people to tweet using this hashtag to

and monitoring this communication network

spread awareness that they are against some

of DHNs was key to understanding the con-

of the websites that do not operate in the

tent they were trying to spread e.g., a mes-

dark web (some .com websites) which pro-

sage or propaganda.

vide services that show images of animal cruelty, feature animal depravity and bestiality. These represented key insights provided
by our methodology, and warrants further
exploratory and observational research into
DHNs.
We

then

split

the

collected

data

into

two (Agent X Agent) networks namely so-

cial network (friends
communication
6 #OpNimr:

and followers ) and
network (mentions, and

Anonymous ght to stop execution
of Saudi youth. AlJazeera. 2015
7 Anonymous launched #OpBeast against animal
cruelty and depravity. TechWorm. 2015
c 2016 ADFSL

We then examined their social network (an
Agent X Agent network of friends/followers
of the hacking groups). This enabled us to
identify the source of information accounts
(accounts who have top out-degree centrality),

the accounts that receive the infor-

mation (accounts who have top in-degree
centrality), and the accounts that work as
bridges between the dierent parts of the
network (accounts who have top betweenness centrality).

Studying the social net-

work was important to understand the roles
of the nodes in the network (e.g., bridges,
seeders of information, etc.)

and the coor-

Page 15
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dination strategies these groups followed to

and Online Behavioral Studies (COSMOS)

spread their message to their audience

lab (en et al., 2016).

3.2.2
Here,

8

We ran the FSA algorithm on the com-

FSA Findings

munication network (see Figure 2) which

we applied the FSA algorithm on

communication network and the social
network to nd the most coordinating set
the

enabled us to identify the set of nodes that
are communicating together at the highest
frequencies. Running FSA here resulted in 8

of nodes instead of single node analysis.

FSAs (groups) which contain 58 nodes to-

FSA is a recursive modularity-based algo-

tal (the number of nodes in each FSA is

rithm.

shown in Table 1, FSA with

Modularity is a network structural

ID = 1

has

measure that evaluates cohesiveness of a net-

the highest number of nodes i.e., 18 nodes).

work (Girvan & Newman, 2002). The FSA

Figure 2 shows these focal structures, which

algorithm works in two steps:

are marked inside the blue circle in the gure on left. Upon zooming-in on this struc-

Top-down division step: the
will

partition

graphs

or

the

network

sub-structures.

algorithm
into

sub-

This

will

obtain the candidate focal structures
from the complex network by applying
the Louvain method of computing modularity (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte,
& Lefebvre, 2008).

ture (displayed on the right) we found the set
of nodes that communicate the most. Each
FSA is distinguished by dierent colors. For
example, the

Hacktivist groups

(@OpAnon-

Down) and (@CypherLulz) communicate together a lot more than the rest of the nodes
in the network since they are in the same
focal structure.
We also applied the focal structure algorithm on the social network (the friends

Bottom-up agglomeration step: the
FSA algorithm will stitch the candidate focal structures, i.e., the highly
interconnected focal structure or the
focal structures that have the highest
similarity values are stitched together,
then

the

process

iterates

until

the

highest similarity of all sibling pairs is
less than a given threshold value.

and followers network) (See Figure 3) to nd
the set of nodes that according to their position in the network made them the most
coordinating set of nodes instead of a single
node (a focal structure has to act together
to be powerful or eective).

This resulted

in 2 FSAs (set of nodes or group of nodes)
which contained 46 total nodes (gure 3 on
the left is the social network with the the
FSAs, while the right side represents the a

The similarity between two structures is
measured using the well-known Jaccard's coecient (en et al., 2016; Jaccard, 1912)
which results in a value between 0 and 1

zoomed-in snap showing the 2 FSA nodes).

Think Tank
group and the Cult of the dead cow group are
An example is the hacking group

very powerful/eective if they act together

(where 1 means the two networks are iden-

as they are very well connected in the Twit-

tical and 0 means the two networks are not

ter network (they are in the same focal struc-

similar at all).

ture).

The stitching of the candi-

date focal structures was performed to extract structures with low densities (en et
al., 2016). We used the development version
of FSA in the UALR Center of Social Media

Page 16

8 The

FSA version we used is available online at
http://www.merjek.com (guest account - username:
merjek, password: merjek123)
c 2016 ADFSL
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3.3 Proposed Framework
We propose a framework (See Figure 4)
that can be used to discover the relationship between the deviant groups e.g., hacking groups. The framework starts with seed
knowledge (e.g., accounts or keywords used
by the group) which is usually provided
by domain experts.

Second, data collec-

tion with Twitter API (in our case we used
NodeXl). Third, the analysis of the collected
network by examining the overall network,
then the communication network (tweets,
retweets, mentions or replies) then the social
network (the friends and followers network).
Fourth, the application of FSA analysis (en
et al., 2016) to discover coordinating groups.
Finally, the derivation of insights from the

JDFSL V11N2

Twitter, although there are many other social media outlets.

They are also aware of

the limitation of the data collection constrained by the Twitter API, as it represents a small sample of the total population of Twitter.

For these limitations, we

are planning to study the cross-media aliation of these groups, e.g., the blogs these
DHNs use to disseminate their messages,
and potentially discover hidden links between those groups through cyber forensic
tools and methodologies.

In addition, we

plan to study other social media outlets used
by these groups such as Facebook, Instagram
and Tumblr.
The

analysis

helped

in

answering

our

stated research questions. More specically:

A similar approach has

1. Do DHNs use social media platforms to

been applied to collect and analyze data

coordinate attacks? If so, what are their

during many online events that were car-

levels of sophistication?

ried out by

such as ISIL (Al-

Discussion: DHNs do use social media to

khateeb & Agarwal, 2015b), and during the

coordinate attacks and invite their fol-

dissemination of propaganda where the Dra-

lowers to participate in them in a very

goon Ride Exercise conducted (Al-khateeb

sophisticated manner as shown in the

& Agarwal, Under review).

two aforementioned cases.

results obtained.

deviant groups

4. CONCLUSION &
FUTURE WORK

2. Can their aliations be tracked and
monitored?
Discussion: the aliation of DHNs can
be tracked and monitored through the

In this work, we explored one instance of

usage of online social network analysis

an online deviant group (i.e., DHNs) net-

tools and techniques.

work on Twitter.

what we performed in this study.

We proposed a frame-

work that can be used to understand DHN's
and their methods of communication as well
as what they are communicating.

Such a

framework would enable authorities to act
tactfully and deter and/or reduce the damage done by cyber attacks.

To note, this

framework can be reapplied to other forms
of deviant groups utilizing OSNs, such as violent extremist groups and cybercriminal organizations.
The authors are aware of the limitation
of this framework as it was applied only to
c 2016 ADFSL

This is part of

3. Can their coordination strategies and
communication

networks

be

inferred

from empirical observation, data set collection, and analysis?
Discussion: we believe by collecting data
sets of dierent events from these groups
we can leverage machine learning to
help in predicting the deviant acts or
their corresponding triggers/causes.
4. Can the most inuential set of nodes be
identied?
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Discussion: the most inuential set of

We would also like to acknowledge the valu-

nodes can be identied as our results

able contributions of the undergraduate stu-

showed using the FSA algorithm.

dents, who worked on the research projects
supported

Additionally,
to

bridge

we

the

articulated

gap

between

the
social

by

the

U.S.

National

Science

need

Foundation's (NSF) Research Experiences

net-

for Undergraduates (REU) program (award

work analysis and cyber forensic techniques

number:

to

between

also funded in part by the Elder Family

forensically-

Chair Endowment at the University of New

relevant data. The results showed a strong

Haven. Any opinions, ndings, and conclu-

connection between those dierent DHNs

sions or recommendations expressed in this

through

a

material are those of the authors and do not

high volume of communication seemed to

necessarily reect the views of the funding

occur between them.

organizations. The researchers gratefully ac-

uncover

deviant

hidden

groups,

their

relationships

and

social

obtain

network

and

also

This suggests a so-

phisticated ability to coordinate deviant acts
through their social media communication
vectors.

By applying FSA we were able

to identify the most inuential set of nodes
in the observed social and communication
networks.

By using SNA we were able

to identify the powerful nodes, bridges between

dierent

network

components,

the

hashtags/keywords/bigrams they use, who is
disseminating the most information, etc.
For future work, we plan to analyze the

CNS-1359323).

This research is

knowledge the support.
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APPENDIX A
This appendix contains the results we obtained in our project and mentioned in Section 3.2.

Table 2. Top 10 domains and hashtags

Domains

Entire Graph Count

HashTag

Entire Graph Count

twitter.com

536

anonymous

392

ccc.de

389

opnimr

379

anonops.com

177

opbeast

213

bit.ly

111

intelgroup

200

bu.ly

96

opisis

177

youtu.be

81

cccamp15

125

gov.br

80

higsec

118

co.uk

76

alimohammedalnimr

117

pastebin.com

76

oine

94

rt.com

71

radioanonops

90

Table 3. Top 10 keywords and bigrams

Keyword
rt
anonymous

Entire Graph Count
3256
351

Bigram
tango,down
rt, anonintelgroup

Entire Graph Count
173
94

opnimr

381

saudi, arabia

79

down

308

rt, heidi_coon

65

amp

278

down, lulzsecroot

60

now

250

rt, youranonnews

58

isis

234

heidi_coon, opbeast

47

opbeast

211

rt, kaidinn

45

up

209

lt,3

43

intelgroup

209

alimohammedalnimr, opnimr

43
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